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Introduction 
 
Can illegal markets play a role in a state’s conscious strategies and efforts to establish 
and further order? Are there conditions under which law enforcement takes second 
place to wider considerations of national interest? The relationship between state 
policy and illicit economic activity is typically understood as an oppositional one: 
beyond a sense of lawlessness, illegal markets exist as a threat to the state’s economic 
and fiscal interests. In fact, our contemporary understanding of illegal markets is 
underpinned by the understanding of ‘organised crime’, which is often equally seen 
as inherently oppositional to a state’s claim on law and order over its territory. Con-
temporary discourses leave very little margin for a consideration of the relationship 
between state policy makers and regulators as anything other than conflictual.  
 Nevertheless, the idea that state administrators or agents may collude with agents 
of the underworld, under circumstances and considering the pursuit of a state’s stra-
tegic aims, is not unheard of and unprecedented. There no lack of historical examples 
indicating that state agents will collude with underground elements in so far as such 
collusion is understood as beneficial those strategic aims, particularly in the sphere 
of international relations and as means to interfere with domestic or regional situa-
tions abroad (e.g. Thomson 1994; Campbell 1977). It is far less clear, however, 
whether, with specific regard to economic activity, state administrators would be 
inclined to approach illegal markets as less of a problem to be addressed and more 
as an opportunity to be exploited than legal ones.  
 In this chapter,1 building on our investigation of archival sources in Rhodes and 
Rome with regard to the situation and the policies of the Italian Administration of 
the Dodecanese (the ‘Government of the Italian Islands of the Aegean’) (Espinoza 
and Papanicolaou, 2016) we will offer an example and discussion of precisely this 
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Greek General State Archives of the Dodecanese, for their generous support of our work. 
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latter possibility. Specifically, we interrogate the policy and practical approach of 
the Italian Administration between its early phase up until the mid-1930s towards 
two key areas of illegal economic activity, namely, the smuggling of goods and the 
smuggling or currency. We argue that the geopolitical situation and internal eco-
nomic conditions of the Dodecanese, marked by extensive and intensive presence of 
illegal economic activity, became both a tool for the articulation of the Italian rule 
over the population of this region and a lever for the promotion and pursuit of Italian 
expansionist plans in the wider region of Anatolia and Eastern Mediterranean. The 
two illegal markets we examine were not only synergistic to each other, as we shall 
see soon, but were also conducive to the Italian aim of social pacification in the 
fledging colony.  
 The structure of this chapter is straightforward. We begin with a brief interroga-
tion of the relationship between state and illicit economic activity, aiming to situate 
the Dodecanesian context among other instances of upperworld and underworld con-
vergence. We then proceed to explain in some detail the particularities of that con-
text, particularly in the light of the geopolitical changes it was exposed to around the 
beginning of the 20th century and during the early days of the Italian annexation in 
the 1920s. We provide an account of both areas of illicit activity, the smuggling of 
goods and the smuggling of currency and explain how the local Italian government 
approached them as means to pacify the wider local populations and to co-opt the 
local elites. We conclude with a few reflections on the significance of our findings.  
 
 
The state and illicit economic activity: always conflictual 
 
The purpose of this section is to situate what we found most interesting in our mate-
rial within the wider theoretical debates and insights about the relationship between 
state and illegal markets. The Italian authorities of the Dodecanese had unambiguous 
knowledge of the extensive and emphatic presence of illegal markets. Our material 
suggests that the function of illegal markets appears to have been taken into account, 
if not integrated, in the articulation of Italian political strategies to pacify and co-opt 
local populations. We reserve for the concluding section some qualifications arising 
from the particularities of the Dodecanesian regime and its relation with the general 
policies of Rome and fascism during the period. However, the nature and extent of 
the considerations regarding illicit economic activities in a range official documents 
and reports leave little doubt that the Italian administration engaged directly and 
uniquely with these activities. 
 This is already an intriguing starting point, as in the literature on illicit markets 
there is a very wide consensus regarding the oppositional nature of the relationship 
 
between illicit economic activity and state policies. Much of the literature has fo-
cused on the association of illegal markets and the underground economy with ‘or-
ganised crime’. Firstly, it was thought that the former constitutes an important source 
of income for the latter at the expense of legitimate business and of the fiscal interests 
of the state. And secondly, importantly, to the extent that the connection between 
illegal markets and ‘organised crime’ is present, the organisational element in illegal 
entrepreneurship represents a challenge to the state’s territorial control and authority 
(for an overview, see von Lampe, 2015). The possibility of (quasi-)governmental 
structures accounts for the understanding of state and illegal markets as an opposi-
tional relationship in the discussions of organised crime ever since the latter emerged 
as an important social issue (e.g., Cressey, 1969; Albini, 1971; Arlacchi, 1998). In 
fact, the very notion of sovereignty, which is associated with the modern state, would 
alone account for the designation of underground economic activity as ‘illegal’ and 
undesirable. Nonetheless, the informal economy, escaping the regulatory claim of 
the state, is in itself a widespread reality of economic activity (see Portes et al., 
1989).  
 It is not the case that there is rigid separation and a clear line of demarcation 
between the underworld of illegal markets and the upperworld of the formal econ-
omy and of the state. Legitimate economic actors may engage in illicit economic 
activity, just as illegal entrepreneurs (and ‘organised crime’) may operate from 
within licit economic structures, entities and institutions. There is some consensus 
today that the delineations established by early discussions of illegal markets and 
‘organised crime’, particularly ones that typically reflect policy concerns, are not 
necessarily helpful for understanding the reality of these phenomena (Antonopoulos 
and Papanicolaou, 2014; Fiorentini and Peltzman, 1997; Naylor, 2004; Reuter, 1983; 
Ruggiero, 1996; Van Duyne, 1996; Woodiwiss and Hobbs, 2009), as they tend to 
underestimate the overlap, interchange and interdependency between underworld 
and upperworld. This of course only serves to underscore that from a state adminis-
trator’s viewpoint, illicit economic activity is viewed as a political challenge and 
issue by default (see, e.g., Kerry, 1998), and that the state’s effort to regulate and 
suppress such activity is a genuine and serious expression of its claim to sovereignty. 
Thus, their default position would be the firm denial of any hint or suspicion of such 
interdependency.  
 Once the question of illegal markets has been transposed into lines underscoring 
the political nature of the problem – and much of the literature is very much aware 
of and keen to highlight this aspect (Cressey, 1969; Shelley, 1999), then it rather 
becomes a matter of analytical candour to acknowledge that the national interest may 
always colour the state’s approach and thus mitigate any understanding of that ap-
proach on absolute terms. That a state’s policy may involve some extent of complic-
ity with the underworld is not unheard of, as means of furthering a strategic pursuit, 
particularly in the domain of international politics. For example, McCoy (2003) has 
 
provided a very robust account of how the CIA played a role in the trafficking of 
heroin as part of its cold war strategy and of the US intervention in southeast Asia. 
Earlier on in the same region, the French colonialists tapped into the tribal opium 
economy and relied to some extent on opium revenues to fund the development of 
French Indochina. An equally interesting account emerges from the context of the 
Philippines, where the early 20th century policies of the US colonial regime can be 
seen to have contributed to the ‘creation of regulatory framework for the later rise of 
a thriving vice economy’ (McCoy, 2009, p. 234). This development in its turn is 
understood by McCoy (2009) to have furnished a tool of political rule for both the 
colonial power and the local political elites. It is of course highly doubtful that such 
phenomena could be part of mainstream politics and policy making, certainly not as 
part of domestic politics. The reason for this is that they are much more likely to be 
subject to opposition and to cause scandal. They are typically seen as instances of 
‘parapolitics’ (Wilson and Lindsey, 2009) rather than conventional politics, and they 
seem to be residing predominantly in the domain of foreign policy. Admittedly, how-
ever, the study of such cases remains limited. 
 Our interest for the Italian treatment of illegal markets in the Dodecanese stems 
precisely from this latter consideration: what we understand as a policy of tolerance 
towards illegal markets is situated in the domain of domestic policy. In this case the 
Italian concern with consolidating their sovereign claim over people and territory 
with a view to developing an “ubi consistam” (Lago, 1924a) of Italian imperial 
power in the region. In fact, the colonial context makes this stance even more para-
doxical, as it runs counter to other experiences of colonial rule, including the Italian 
one in Africa, which was marked by prolonged and violence efforts to suppress re-
sistance and to pacify the population (Calchi Novati, 2011; Cresti, 2011; Labanca, 
2002). While the question of illegal markets does not emerge clearly, if at all, in 
histories of the Italian expansionism, colonial pacification, more than military cam-
paigns to suppress resistance, involves an economic aspect and a project with a view 
to reorganising production and economic relationships: its quintessnce is to create 
conditions conducive to economic exploitation (see Neocleous, 2013). In studies of 
other contexts, when the question of illegal markets emerges, it is clear that the sup-
pression of economic activity outlawed by the colonial authorities is a key concern 
and a primary goal of these authorities (e.g., Tagliacozzo, 2005).  
 In the remainder of this chapter we aim to document in some detail the situation 
in the Dodecanese and the coordinates of the Italian approach, particularly by inves-
tigating the conditions under which the existence and function of illegal markets in 
that region came to be understood as a peculiar political opportunity for the Italian 
authorities.  
 
 
 
Between geopolitical change and economic decline:  
the emergence of illegal markets in the Dodecanese 
 
The task we aim to accomplish in this section is to situate the emergence of illicit 
economic activity in the Dodecanese as a general reality in the final quarter of the 
19th century and into the period of the Italian occupation of the region that com-
menced in mid-1912. As we have provided a more detailed account of the historical 
context elsewhere (Espinoza and Papanicolaou, 2016), we focus here on those as-
pects that we consider the key for the development of illegal markets in the Dodec-
anese.  
 Most students and commentators of the region’s situation seem to identify the 
growth of illegal markets with the latter’s economic decline following domestic po-
litical change in the Ottoman Empire and the introduction of taxes and duties aiming 
primarily to service the Ottoman public debt. Not much is known about illicit activity 
in the period prior to that point and up to the first thirty years of the 19th century, but 
it is certain that the economic significance of the Dodecanese had remained marginal 
as economic growth itself had been very limited. The ‘barren islands’ of the archi-
pelago (Desio, 1924) did not lend themselves well to the development of agriculture. 
This geography and other related circumstances contributed to the development of a 
preponderantly subsistence economy. Such limitations meant that for primary sub-
sistence goods such as foodstuff, cattle and other basic provisions, the region de-
pended heavily on the Anatolian coast and the port of Izmir, located a stone’s throw 
away from the islands of the Dodecanese (Ameglio, 1913). Equally adverse had been 
the conditions for the growth of naval commerce of some significance, as even the 
largest islands such as Rhodes or Kos lacked suitable locations for the development 
of significant ports. At any rate, the region’s production had been of limited, if any, 
interest to export markets. 
 Clearly, therefore, up to the mid-19th century there was little to support significant 
economic activities, including illicit activities, except piracy. It is, of course, con-
ceivable that some activity may have occurred following the establishment of the 
independent Kingdom of Greece in the early 1830s. The creation of a new border 
opened the possibility that Dodecanesian entrepreneurs could take advantage of the 
difference in the customs regimes of Greece and Ottoman Empire to undercut licit 
markets. The reason for such a development could have been – eventually, it became 
a factor – the special taxation and customs regime, known as ‘privileges’. These were 
granted to the islands, except Rhodes and Kos, by the Suleiman the Magnificent 
following the conquest of the region in 1522, and which remained in place until the 
late 19th century. The islands enjoyed extensive self-government and their only tax 
obligation to the Empire consisted in a yearly lump tribute, a regime, which may 
have functioned as an assymetry (Passas, 2001) conducive to the growth of illicit 
 
activities.  
 A complementary factor, benefitting the region’s economy in all aspects, 
emerged in the course of the 19th century, as the growth of industry and trade inter-
nationally, and technological developments such as steam navigation, gave the Do-
decanese a new economic significance. On the one hand, a local product, sponge, 
became an industrial resource of significance and thus boosted sponge fishing to the 
status of a key and sizeable local industry. On the other hand, the development of 
trades route via the Suez Canal underscored the significance of the region as a com-
mercial crossroads in the Eastern Mediterranean. The surplus of wealth thus gener-
ated gave a decisive boost to the local economy in its entirety. It firstly made possible 
significant investment in infrastructure, such as public works and education. Sec-
ondly, it encouraged the growth of other local industries, such as the tobacco industry 
– one that also developed into a mass scale production in the course of the 19th cen-
tury.  
 In the off-season the women made cigarettes from imported tobacco, many of 
which were smuggled into Greece. With their wealth, settlers from Calymnos bought 
farms on the mainland, and sold European goods in Budrum and up the gulfs. There 
were similar settlers from Cos. Like Calymnos also, Symi had farms and small set-
tlements on the mainland and on the peninsula of Cnidus to the north, where there 
are both cattle pastures and plantations of olives and almonds. There was a flourish-
ing yard for building sponge-trading boats and small vessels, and for prompt and 
skilful repairs. Cos established a ‘lucrative trade in fresh fruit and vegetables with 
Egypt, carried till recently in its own spacious and speedy sailing vessels’ (Myres, 
1941, p. 147).  
 The islands were successful in prolonging the conditions for economic growth up 
until the late 19th century, by resisting the administrative and fiscal policy changes 
introduced by the Ottomans during the tanzimat reform period (Inalcik and Quataert, 
1997)2, which also involved greater uniformity across the territory of the Empire. 
But this implied the abolition of the ‘privileges’. During this period the Ottoman 
reform efforts were resisted by the local populations, often in strong and vocal forms 
(Doumanis, 1997, p. 29). A more decisive development was the establishment of the 
Ottoman Public Debt Administration (OPDA) in 1881, which was accompanied by 
the policy measures such as the introduction of monopolies on tobacco, salt, alcohol 
and a license fee for sponge fishing. As the purpose of the OPDA was to administer 
the servicing of the Ottoman public debt towards European creditors, taxes and du-
ties were intended to be collected and administered centrally, ultimately meaning 
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that a key factor for the economic growth of the region, fiscal autonomy, was to be 
removed. While at an initial stage the very purpose of this development, servicing 
foreign debt, entailed a rather lax approach by the Ottoman authorities, the reform 
programme of the Young Turks brought formally all privileges to an end, without 
exception (Alhadeff, 1927).  
 At that time, however, certain local industries had already grown to significant 
size. For example, the manufacturing of cigarettes and cigarette paper by numerous 
small workshops, had become a key source of employment and income in islands 
such as Kalymnos. The attrition and finally the removal of the regime of privileges 
meant that ultimately such businesses had to seek ways to secure their survival and 
engaging in illegal trade turned out to be one of them. This is reflected in retrospec-
tive discussions of the situation by Italian officials: one of the military commanders 
of the Dodecanese noted in 1918 that “under the Ottoman regime, smuggling consti-
tuted the only and true profession of Calymnos, Symi and Chalki, that specialised in 
this industry” (Elia, 1918).  
 The descent of the local economic circuits into the domains of the underground 
was to be consolidated further with the beginning of the Italian occupation of the 
Dodecanese during the Italo-Turkish war of 1912. While the domestic policies of the 
Ottoman Empire had triggered the onset of larger scale illegal trading, the Italian war 
in Libya and then WWI brought geopolitics to the foreground as the preponderant 
factor underpinning the economic fates of the region. The dependence of the islands 
for vital subsistence goods on the Anatolian coast was dictated by geography and 
their geophysical outlook. It became a major issue during the war as the Ottomans 
closed the newly established Italian possession’s access to these markets. This en-
tailed that not only goods intended for export but also subsistence goods had to be 
traded illicitly, the alternative being rapid and radical economic and social decline. 
It was not the case that the region completely escaped this fate—due to the Ottoman 
embargo, economic conditions deteriorated significantly. It became so serious that 
the Italian military authorities had to organise a supply chain for food directly from 
Italy to rescue local populations from the spectre of famine (Doumanis, 1997). At 
the same time, the Italian occupation authorities, aiming to maintain their hold over 
the population of the Dodecanese, had been reluctant to impose a new order on the 
region’s socio-political life. Thereby they acknowledged and retained the Ottoman 
era privileges as the prevailing administrative status quo of the Dodecanese. Under 
this regime, the very same factor that accelerated the growth of the region’s econ-
omy, became, as we shall see in the next section, a factor for the consolidation and 
accelerated the expansion and growth of illegal markets up until the early 1930s, 
when Italo-Turkish relations began to improve.  
 
 
 
Two complementary illicit markets and the Italian stance  
towards them 
 
We have already identified a combination of factors underpinning the emergence 
and operation of illicit economic activity in early 20th-century Dodecanese: firstly, 
the productive limitations of the islands themselves, which entailed heavy depend-
ence for subsistence goods and other trade on the neighbouring coast of Anatolia; 
secondly, the declining economic position of the region triggered by the removal of 
aspects of domestic Ottoman policies upholding its trade position; and thirdly, the 
subjection of this activity to the implications of the geopolitical position of the is-
lands and the ebb and flow of Italo-Turkish relations.  
 The newly acquired territory came to be seen by the Italians as another oppor-
tunity for colonial expansion during the 1910s and the course of WWI. and then 
during the onset of the fascist rule in metropolitan Italy as a potential strategic lever 
for the Italian ambitions in Anatolia (Espinoza and Papanicolaou, 2016). They, how-
ever, were thus presented with a double challenge, namely, sustaining on the one 
hand, the strategic relevance of the Dodecanese towards Anatolia despite the Otto-
man embargo and then the continuing mistrust and protectionism of the Turkish Re-
public. On the other hand, the Italians also had to address the irredentism of the 
Greeks (Zervos, 1919). This was the dominant ethnic group among the region’s di-
verse population, and thus it was important to formulate an approach towards paci-
fying these populations, and, given the region’s traditionalist sociopolitical structure, 
co-opt the local elites to the Italian rule.  
 Following the annexation of the Dodecanese to Italy with the Treaty of Lausanne 
in 1923, the new regime in Rome under Mussolini bestowed the Dodecanese with 
an administrative framework (Royal Decree of 8 August 1924) that provided the 
colonial-style role of the Governor with ample autonomy and powers. However, it 
remained accountable directly to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and thus the Duce 
himself. The appointed Governor, Mario Lago proved to be precisely the kind of 
office holder that would make full use of such autonomy and power. Himself a career 
diplomat and a politically astute individual, Lago was among the most zealous pro-
ponent of Italian expansion in Anatolia, an idea that he held on to even after the 
conclusion of the 1928 Neutrality and Reconciliation Treaty and the gradual normal-
isation of Italo-turkish relations. As Lago saw the newly established Turkish Repub-
lic as a precarious and transient reality, his policies were unambiguously animated 
precisely by a vision of the Dodecanese as a bastion of Italian power.  
 “I believe I am not exaggerating when I state that on the resumption of regular 
commercial relations between Rhodes and the Anatolian coast depends greatly 
the valorisation of our splendid Possession, which must become the ubi con-
sistam of Italian power in the Levant” (Lago, 1924a). 
 
Alongside an Italian programme of gradual modernisation of the Possedimento’s 
productive base that was seen as ambitious and perhaps well-received by the Dodec-
anesians at the time (Doumanis, 1997), Lago pursued policies that on one hand, 
aimed to neutralise the sources of potential agitation among the wider population, 
and on the other hand, to co-opt the local commercial and financial elites that con-
trolled much of the economic activity in the region. With regard to the illicit econ-
omy, this strategy of social pacification practically translated into an approach of 
‘relative tolerance’, as we call it, towards illegal markets, aspects of which we will 
document in the following sections. Of course, it is not the case that the Italian law 
and customs agencies did not establish a degree of activity, which from their own 
viewpoint may have appeared difficult but substantial nevertheless (e.g., for the 
Guardia di Finanza's deployment and record see Cecini, 2014). But as Lago ulti-
mately embodied and acted as the final authority in the Possedimento, his commu-
nications to Rome (and also his practice) reflect considerations and intentions of 
strategic importance for the view of the Italian management of the colony’s affairs.  
 
The smuggling of goods  
 
While analytically the examination of the generic category ‘goods’ would appear to 
confound different illegal markets, our purpose in this section is to document the 
Italian Administration’s approach towards the goods that could be considered as the 
prime mover of Dodecanesian society. It is with regard to these goods that the de-
pendency of the islands’ economy on the Anatolian coast is exhibited best. The clos-
ing of the border by the Turkish authorities during WWI, which had devastated the 
region during WWI, presented the Italian colonial authority with a key policy double 
challenge in the early 1920s and after. On the one hand, it had to prevent severe 
disruptions in the rhythm of the wider population’s everyday life, such as the provi-
sioning of the islands with vital food supplies and the other day-to-day small trade 
with the Anatolian coast. . . . . On the other, it had to address the potentially devas-
tating effect of the Turkish policy on the commercial routes to Anatolia. The latter 
were seen as an important component of Italian expansionist policies in Asia Minor, 
but at the same time, important commercial agencies depended on these routes; legal 
as well as illegal: by the time of Lago’s arrival in Rhodes, the growth of illegal trade 
with the coast had become endemic, and the new Governor himself was acutely 
aware of that reality.  
“[T]he reopening of the east coast is a matter of life or death for the commerce of 
Rhodes [. . .] The local effects of this crisis are intuitive. A large part of the Do-
decanesian population that used to live on the Anatolian trade, currently suffers 
from the darkest poverty. Rather, in order to survive, it throws itself into riskier 
smuggling. Naturally, even though they know it is not the Italian regime’s fault 
 
that such disaster has befallen them, the Dodecanesians do not hold a high opinion 
of our authority. Which helps create a widespread mood, if not of hostility, at 
least of distrust, very harmful to the order of our regime. Smuggling becomes 
every day more organised in almost regular form with the collaboration of the 
Turks from the coast, who suffer from the uneconomical situation created by the 
Turkish government as much as our subjects” (Lago, 1924a).  
 
The situation described by Lago in 1924, was to be prolonged throughout the 1920s 
due to the protectionist policies and the Turkish deep mistrust of the Italian presence 
in the region. For example, in 1929 the inspector of the Bank of Italy, Arturo Pala-
dini, was reporting that in the past Rhodes was an important supply centre of the 
nearby lands, and of Anatolia more particularly, which is only a few hours of sailing 
away. However, this commercial function that gave reason for private banks and a 
good number of merchants to exist in this city has been deteriorating gradually. Ac-
cording to Paladini trade became ever more difficult due to the tendency of the neigh-
bouring nations to eliminate from their territories every form of foreign penetration, 
whether commercial or industrial. Despite this, the local commerce, which depends 
much on the smuggling on the Anatolian coast, remained sufficiently active, as 
demonstrated by the increased traffic of the port and the very low number of bank-
ruptcies (Paladini, 1929). 
 The early realisation of the problem and the persistence of the trade barriers to 
Anatolia throughout the 1920s, gave rise to a unique understanding of the situation 
by Governor Lago. He thought smuggling was impossible to suppress because Italy 
as “a great power, cannot leave a population which she has taken under its guardian-
ship to suffocate, without her prestige being profoundly damaged throughout the Le-
vant” (Lago, 1924b). Apart from that, smuggling was taking place “completely to 
our advantage and at the expense of Turkey”. This stance also led Lago to be very 
cautious of and to even resist Turkish demands towards Italy to suppress contraband 
in the Dodecanese. He commented: 
“I insist, however, that I must indicate the risks of [any] agreements entailing 
turkish interference towards the suppression of contraband. Firstly, whichever 
concessions we made in this area to the Turks for Kastellorizo, we may have to 
extend them to other islands, thus creating obstacles and situations of conflict that 
are difficult to foresee; and secondly, we must admit frankly that the exercise of 
smuggling will be inevitably one of the activities of the Italian islands of the Ae-
gean” (Lago, 1923).  
 
As a result, smuggling became quasi-institutionalised throughout the 1920s in the 
Dodecanese; even to such an extent that it came to represent a primary economic 
activity of the smaller islands, and also a significant part of commercial flows 
through Rhodes. This was not a well-hidden secret, as it were: as the journalist Vir-
ginio Gayda, an individual very close to Rome’s fascist regime, noted  
 
 “[u]nder the pressure of these four negative elements, but, above all, of the 
increasing distrust and resistance of the Turkish authorities, the commerce of 
the Dodecanese has been driven back from the Turkish coast, and, therefore, 
it has been cut off from its vital base. There is no more commerce except con-
traband. Defying storms and the darkness of the night in order to survive, 
Greek and Turkish sailors brought their boats and sails towards the coast, fur-
tively loading and unloading goods with the complicity of the indigenous pop-
ulation” (Gayda, 1928, p. 149).  
But why exactly was Governor Lago adamant that smuggling took place entirely at 
the expense of Turkey? “Our customs authorities”, he noted, “are charged with the 
task of ensuring that the goods do not enter [our territory] as contraband. Once they 
have landed, whether they arrive or not to their destination, I do not believe it is our 
duty to oversee” (Lago, 1927). From his point of view, as long as the low customs 
duties of the Possedimento had been paid, anything went – the goods were free to 
move in whichever way the involved merchants and entrepreneurs saw fit. This be-
ing the official stance, even very established companies began in the 1920s not only 
to import but also to produce goods destined to be smuggled.  
 Take for example the firm Alhadeff, perhaps the most important and sizeable 
commercial entity in Rhodes, which was also connected with the Alhadeff Bank be-
longing to the same family. The firm produced, in association with the Benosiglio 
firm in Kos, two types of cigarette paper (Memphis and Tebriz) which were destined 
to be traded in large quantities on the black market in Turkey exclusively. Vittorio 
Alhadeff himself, commenting on this type of activity, remarked in his memoirs that 
“our commerce was fully legal. We were selling to the Anatolian merchants who 
came to and went from Rhodes on their caïques. How do they enter the goods in 
Anatolia? That’s their business” (Alhadeff, 1998, p. 174). 
 Awareness of the idea that contraband was taking place “to the advantage of It-
aly” was also shared by members of the law enforcement agencies in the Dodeca-
nese. Reporting in the 1930s on two “influential” individuals of Greek ethnic origin 
form Patmos, the local commander of the Carabinieri noted  
 
“how in the past [the first individual] practiced effectively and notoriously, and 
on a large scale, the smuggling of alcohol and other goods at the expense of 
Greece and Turkey, activity that was seen favourably by the Government of the 
time [. . .] also because it did not do any harm to our treasury, as he had always 
declared the merchandise which bought in order to smuggle it subsequently. . . . 
[the other individual] managed to attain a solid financial position, particularly 
with profits he made by exercising, as is well known to us, the smuggling of cig-
arette paper in our favour and at the expense of Greece and Turkey” (Grassini, 
1937).  
 
 
The tolerance towards smuggling persisted beyond the 1920s and the normalisation 
of Italian-Turkish relations after 1928. Whether the Italians felt confident enough to 
intervene in the operation of illegal markets is a moot point. To be sure, the removal 
of the key geopolitical consideration meant that smuggling could perhaps be seen 
more clearly as an activity detrimental to the fiscal interests of the colony. At the 
same time, Rome had undertaken a effort to modernise Italian customs legislation 
and that brought about a wholesale strengthening of sanctions against smuggling, 
and also the introduction of additional offences relating to this activity. Nevertheless, 
with the local economy still damaged by the prolonged economic decline and hard-
ship and with Lago retaining ultimate authority in the Dodecanesian affairs, policies 
of tolerance remained in place. For example, there was official support for appeals, 
leniency towards convicted smugglers and even pardons and amnesties. This policy 
was practiced consciously in the Possedimento’s territory, precisely on individual 
grounds of poverty and inability to pay fines and so on. 
 In 1932, for example, the local commander of the Guardia di Finanza in Rhodes 
was still reporting that the inhabitants of the island [Halki, in this instance], not hav-
ing other local resources, dedicate themselves exclusively to the clandestine trade of 
tobacco: they import it as leaves from Greece or Turkey, process it and then they 
export it in the most convenient mode, especially to the nearby island of Rhodes 
(Spinelli, 1932). The task of the Guardia di Finanza section itself was to merely re-
port to Rhodes the departure of any “suspicious boat”. 
 Overall, we see why, in our view, there are good reasons to call the relative tol-
erance of the Italian authorities towards smuggling a ‘strategy’. Under the overarch-
ing aim of keeping alive the Italian expansionist ambitions in Anatolia, by means of 
commercial infiltration, the Italian authorities appear to have pursued two important 
goals domestically in the Possedimento. On one hand, by not actively disrupting the 
circuits of illicit trade in the region, the Italian authorities ensured that latter’s eco-
nomic life, which involved illicit trading to a remarkable and vital extent, was not 
itself disrupted. Smuggling in this sense would be seen as a cushion, absorbing the 
local population’s economic distress and consequently, any political implications 
that such distress would entail, preponderantly Greek irredentism. At the same time, 
Lago’s regime seems to have been able to take advantage of this circumstance to co-
opt and integrate the commercial and also other local elites in the emerging system 
of colonial rule, in so far as illicit markets represented an opportunity for good busi-
ness for everyone involved.  
 
The smuggling of currency 
 
The extent to which the above three aspects of the Italian approach had been very 
closely interwoven, is illustrated by an equally widespread illicit activity which may 
 
be regarded as complementary to the smuggling of goods, the smuggling of currency. 
Again, the activity can be understood to be of importance for the liquidity of both 
legal and illegal markets For the illicit market it is a condition for its operations; it is 
particularly in this circuit that the regime’s relation with the local commercial elites 
can be seen more crisply.  
 The Dodecanese under the Ottoman rule had featured a rather anarchical banking 
system, featuring a handful of powerful local family banks and commercial firms 
that could finance the local population’s commercial activity. As most of the cur-
rency circulating in the region was absorbed in trade and currency speculation, the 
figures of banker, merchant and money changer were often indistinguishable. These 
banks and commercial firms were able to take advantage of wartime conditions in 
the 1910s to consolidate their dominant position in the operation of local economic 
circuits. Salomon Alhadeff and Fils, for example, which was mentioned previously, 
had by the mid-1920s successfully brought most of the region’s trade under its con-
trol: it has a powerful organisation which was reinforced by the credit and prestige 
of the Bank Alhadeff. The two agencies were distinct legally and operate in different 
and well separated fields, yet as both are constituted by elements connected by the 
ties of kinship, they are emotionally and financially solidary. That means they acted 
to mutually complement each other in a form of moral and financial cooperation that 
represented a force that was formidable in relation to the modest potential of the 
market. In fact, there was no undertaking or business of any importance in which 
one did not find the name of Alhadeff, just as there is no nice property that does not 
belong to any of them (Paladini, 1926). 
 As these local bourgeois elites were integral to the region's economic life in its 
totality, Governor Lago’s policy tended to protect and maximise their liberty even if 
that meant a range of exceptions from metropolitan legislative requirements and reg-
ulations applicable to banking. Such a stance can be understood again by means of 
the interpretative scheme we propose. That is, the strategy towards the pacification 
of local populations – cooptation of the elites – to support of the Italian ambitions in 
Anatolia. 
 In the circuit of the currency trade in 1920s and early 1930s Dodecanese, Lago’s 
maximisation of liberty approach translated into an exceptional regime that placed 
no restrictions on the movement of currency in the region, and lacked any regulatory 
provisions regarding the trade in foreign currency. To justify his policy, the Gover-
nor again referred to the “normal movement of business that takes place here with 
special characteristics and exigencies”, in the light of the need to maintain active the 
trade flows between the Dodecanese and Anatolia. To that end, he resisted any pos-
sibility of interfering with the trade of currency, legal and, not explicitly, illegal.  
 “Prior to the detachment from Turkey, the natural market of the islands had 
been Anatolia. These markets constituted a centre for the collection and dis-
tribution of overseas trade just as their transit commerce was booming, from 
 
which the islands drew most of their wealth. Such commerce ceased almost 
completely after the territorial political separation of the Possedimento from 
the Continent [Asia]. 
 The Dodecanesian merchants, aiming to maintain the traffic in their hands, 
while it could easily turn towards the major centres of Turkey, particularly 
Smirna and Adalia, finance [instead], via local banks, the producers of the 
goods in the form of advances.  
 Hence a movement of Turkish currency towards current account operations, a 
movement, which cannot be documented in the ways prescribed by the current 
regulations in the Kingdom [of Italy]. 
 Another field of commercial activity particular to these transactions is consti-
tuted by the importation from Anatolia of goods, above all goods of first ne-
cessity (cattle, vegetables, eggs and many other alimentary goods), which are 
transported here by boat in noticeable quantity, but in small batches, by mod-
est Turkish merchants, who, once they’ve sold their goods in Italian lire, must 
convert the proceeds into Turkish money in order to re-enter their country.  
 It is a daily and small-scale traffic, which in its totality represents one of the 
cornerstones of the commercial activity of the islands; and it is easy to under-
stand, from the very same way it is conducted, that it could not be practically 
subjected to the rule of the normal trade of currency” (Lago, 1932; p.2). 
 The situation that Lago does not explicitly acknowledge, and thus obscures in his 
report, is that most of the flows of Turkish currency in and out of the Dodecanese 
had been illegal, precisely because Turkey prohibited either the exportation or the 
importation of its currency. Consequently, in so far as commerce with the Anatolian 
coast required liquidity in Turkish currency, it relied to a considerable extent on con-
traband money, made available to the Dodecanesians by small sellers or more estab-
lished commercial actors, such as the banking firms of Rhodes, which would also 
rely on the informal currency market for liquidity in Turkish money. Practically, the 
course of historical events of the early 20th century “created the particular situation, 
where a large majority of the population itself is in possession, more or less, of for-
eign currency, credit abroad and foreign securities” (Gigli, 1934b p. 404 ?). As a 
result, the trade of currency could spread widely and informally, and was very open 
to speculation.  
 This “special' situation in the Possedimento was not unknown to banking regula-
tors, whose internal communications usually comment on and document very clearly 
both the anarchical order of things and the Governor's protective approach towards 
it. On several occasions, attempts to enforce some of the standards required by the 
metropolitan banking system proved to be a frustrating failure, due to the extent of 
informality that characterised the trade of currencies. Reports of the local inspector 
of the Bank of Italy in Rhodes, Fortunato Gigli, director of the local branch, 
 
acknowledge clearly the challenges posed by the specific configuration of the cur-
rency market. 
 “|The Turkish banknotes form the most important base of the coastal trade 
with the neighbouring coasts. Here, far from the great centres and without any 
banking equipment, what counts is not the cheque that is difficult to cash, but 
only the banknote. The small sailing boats, motorboats etc. depart, equipped 
with banknotes, for the ports of Anatolia. They make their purchases and re-
turn with the provisions necessary to the population (primarily cattle, coal, 
wood, coffee etc.)” (Gigli, 1934a, p.411). 
 "With Turkish banknotes (in Rhodes there is a very active exchange of this 
currency which is smuggled in and out of Turkey) advances are given for the 
production in Anatolia of beams, which are then exported to Egypt and sold 
in sterling with a conspicuous profit margin” (Gigli, 1934b, p. 405). 
 “Such activity is very difficult to control in so far as, thanks to the intermedi-
aries, everything takes place without documents, without contracts, with some 
bills and a lot of trust, which arises from habit” (Gigli, 1934b, p.406).  
 While in the 1920s this particular outlook was seen by Lago as critical to the 
survival of the Dodecanesian trade flows with Anatolia, in the early 1930s informal-
ity in the currency market still retained its relevance for the bigger local commercial 
players, who, as seen previously, were typically combining merchant activities and 
banking operations. These players, would still tap into the informal currency market 
to secure a sufficient supply of Turkish currency. As Governor Lago, arguing against 
calls for regulation, remarked:  
 “[i]t must be observed that some local firms have branches abroad, above all 
in Turkey and Greece. Now, it would prove very difficult for these firms to 
finance their agencies with the necessary foreign currencies, for which it 
would not be possible to present invoices to prove the corresponding acquisi-
tion of goods” (Lago, 1932). 
In the course of the early 1930s these local banks also took advantage of the local 
situation to engage more actively in speculation in the currency trade, an endeavour, 
which in some cases proved extremely lucrative and strengthened considerably the 
position of these firms. Around the time, Italian regulators moved more aggressively 
to impose discipline on the foreign currency trade, by requiring that all remittances 
in Italian or foreign currency and all foreign credit by the “bankers, money changers, 
companies, firms and institutions” be declared, and that all operations in exchange 
currency must demonstrate their relevance to the real needs of the industry and com-
merce or to the needs of those travelling abroad. Essentially, this was an effort to 
both formalise and “moralise” (Poli, 1949) the foreign currency trade.  
 The authority of the Possedimento, however, still resisted these efforts and se-
cured for the Dodecanese exceptions from this regime, so as “not to embarrass the 
trade patterns in the region” (Gigli, 1934c). Governor Lago appeared determined to 
 
defend the interests of the pro-Italian local bourgeoisie, this time by resisting greater 
transparency in the conduct of their business in the name of not disrupting the status 
quo in the region and by refusing to differentiate between population and the big 
local commercial actors. Unsurprisingly, this policy ultimately benefited the latter 
more than the former, since the defence of the practices of the wider population were 
a defence of subsistence economy, whereas the defence of the practices of the bigger 
local commercial interest facilitated an enormous accumulation of wealth.  
 
“It is at any rate a fact that under the auspices of the Italian administration [this 
bank] . . . benefited . . . from the most complete liberty of action with regard to 
the movement of currency, which flowed abundantly to it . . .” And: 
“What is certain is that the company developed after the Italian occupation [1912-
1923], and its fortune, which was well limited in 1912, was estimated in 1938, 
indeed with great approximation, around 80 million lire in Rhodes and abroad” 
(Poli, 1949, pp. 2, 8) 
 
In sum, once again it is possible to see how the Italian colonial administration con-
sistently approached legal and illegal markets and practices as a unity, firmly inte-
grated and attuned to the region’s economic reality. This approach was not a conces-
sion, or a confession of weakness: rather it appears to be the result of a conscious 
concern to use the functions of the local economic circuits in order to further the 
consolidate the Italian rule on the Dodecanese and develop a new system of power, 
suited to Italy’s enduring expansionist ambitions in Anatolia. 
 
 
Concluding reflections 
 
Can illegal markets play a role in a state’s conscious strategies and efforts to establish 
and reproduce order, and are there conditions under which law enforcement takes a 
second place to wider considerations of national interest? It would appear that, in 
light of the Dodecanesian experience under the Italian colonial administration, the 
possibility must be affirmed. In fact, what would lend unity to the policies of the 
Italian administration is precisely such considerations of higher national interest, 
namely the development of a support platform for the pursuit of wider foreign policy 
ambitions of fascist Italy. Tolerance of illicit economic activity involving the wider 
population provided a cushion absorbing the tensions emerging from economic hard-
ship and thus their political implications with regard to the stability of the regime 
domestically in the Dodecanese. At the same time, the same policy of tolerance via 
the acceptance of illicit practices and the avoidance of regulation, helped the regime 
articulate a vital bond with the local financial and commercial elites, which main-
tained a dominant position over the islands’ economic life. Ensuring domestic sta-
bility in the colony was seen as key to the development of the lever for imperialist 
 
expansion that Governor Lago saw as the Possedimento’s ultimate purpose.  
 Whether the story of the Dodecanese offers any lessons that are of wider rele-
vance in our understanding of the relations between state and the illicit economy is 
a moot point. There are important elements of the Dodecanesian experience that 
would not be readily transferable to other contexts and contemporary situations. For 
example, Governor Lago’s quasi-absolutist position (sanctioned by the Dodeca-
nese’s ‘constitutional’ arrangement, or perhaps the particularities of Lago’s relation-
ship with the fascist regime in Rome. Intuitively, such an experience would not lend 
itself easily to conditions prevailing in a true liberal democratic polity. In fact, Lago’s 
policies, particularly those towards the local economic elites, would be more likely 
to be seen as generalised corruption, rather than rational policy. Nevertheless, the 
bureaucratic compartmentalisation of the modern state could notionally be seen as 
conducive to a situation in which, with regard to illegal markets and their political 
uses, some parts of the state may recognise opportunities where others perceived 
unqualified threats.  
 Our main point is that this possibility cannot be abstractly excluded. Particularly 
under the label of ‘organised crime’ illegal markets are seen as absolute threats and 
the content of any policy cannot be other that of active opposition and suppression. 
What our account offers, is precisely a glimpse of the view from the heights of state 
administration: our explanatory scheme is derived from the reports and communica-
tions from the highest echelons of the Italian administration in Rhodes and in Rome: 
Lago to Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Mussolini, head of local branch to the di-
rectors of Bank of Italy, and so on. These kinds of strategic deliberations are not 
always and easily accessible to students of contemporary realities. Archival materi-
als allow broader access and thus the construction of much richer accounts. The pos-
sibility, however, that policy and enforcement gaps do not necessarily represent 
merely technical problems suggests – as our story shows – that such strategic con-
siderations may be nevertheless highly relevant.  
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